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Abstract: In this article we perform a juxtaposition of Wittgenstein’s confession
with the art of drama. Our aim is to transpose the private language argument
criticizing the ostensive definition of internal objects (beetle in a box thought ex-
periment) onto confession and the art of drama performance. The play (possibly
called “game”) of the actor is not an expression of his soul interior, but an au-
tonomous necessity in the most decisive meaning – which means: the only thing
to be done. Correspondingly, confession doesn’t express any interior misery – it
is an acting (the double sense of this word will be further developed), the only
possible acting within these conditions, the only possible response to one’s con-
dition – a condition of mutilation where human misery appears very distinctly.
Confession creates neither a relation of power (as Foucault was demonstrating
in his late writings) nor a form of emotional exhibitionism but a language
game consisting on words judging oneself, immune to interpretation, explana-
tion, and vanity coming from their expression. Irreplaceable words become the
agent of salvation.¹
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Wittgenstein perhaps more than understand his philosophy. I should first address many thanks
to Dr. Ilse Somavilla who welcomed me on the beautiful roof of the Brenner Archives in Inns-
bruck together with its director Prof. Ulrike Tanzer (Thank you!). It is through Ilse Somavilla’s
writings and archive editing work that I could engage myself and follow her on a path of reading
Wittgenstein with a sensibility for religion and art.
I owe also a lot of thankfulness to Prof. Alois Pichler for long lasting, repeated hospitality
in the Wittgenstein Archives at the Bergen University and great patience for my plans of devel-
oping research plans about Wittgenstein in the Polish Galicia. The ability to visit these two pla-
ces, Norway and Austria, have left inside myself a Wittgensteinian imagery that creates the sce-
nography of my philosophical attempt inside this article. My research would not be possible
without receiving the scholarship of the Republic of Austria OEAD for which I also express
my deep gratitude.
I am also very grateful to Kasia Mala for her linguistic revision of my article.
And finally, what triggered this Winn-gensteinian performance were unforgettable dinners
with Maja, my Mother Agata, and my son Światopełek – to say they were inspiring is not
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Take words with you and return to the Lord. Say
to him: “Forgive all our sins and receive us




Writers, poets, filmmakers fascinated by the figure of Wittgenstein were sincere
enough to admit they do not really grasp Wittgenstein’s philosophy but are en-
chanted by his personality – the mythical personality constituted by selected pic-
tures from his biography, his friends’ memoirs, scattered remarks.Wittgenstein is
a philosopher of culture not because he has attempted any cultural analysis, nor
because his remarks on language have sneaked into the language of cultural dis-
putes, but due to his cultural education in one of the last artistic milieu of the
highest quality. Educated in this entourage he has acquired a sensibility for
words not only logical but also aesthetical so that every phrase he pronounced
was turning into a captivating image and every sentence was full of vibrant
dramaturgy. This imagery that surrounds Wittgenstein is double dealing, it can
easily turn a philosopher into an idol copied in thousands reproductions by a
popularizing culture that no longer understands the language of philosophy,
but it can also be the basis of an iconic relation with the appearing images, in
which culture could enter into dialogue with this thin layer of argumentum ex si-
lentio that Wittgenstein cared so much about. G. W. Sebald, one of a number of
artists (Thomas Bernhard, Samuel Beckett among others) who concealed Witt-
genstein under the costume of a literary character, said:
[…] Wittgenstein constantly accompanies me / not that I understand his philosophy –
which almost no one understands – but because the story of his personality was develop-
ing in such a way with all pathological aspects is infinitely fascinating for me. I cannot be
saturated with watching his photography. (Sebald 2015: 28.08.2015)
This line of understanding Wittgenstein can certainly be misleading. I would risk
to say that what remits such a reductive approach in terms of philosophy is only
art itself – the making of a work of art. This issue has fascinated Wittgenstein
both in a metaphysical and a physical aspect. The metaphysical aspect can be
discerned from Wittgenstein’s dialogue within two intertwined milieux, the
one he met in 1916 in Olomouc, readers of Karl Krauss, especially Paul Engel-
mann, together with whom he has build his sister’s house in Vienna; and the sec-
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ond group that can be discerned around Ludwig von Ficker and his periodic
“The Brenner”. Two well-known and largely interpreted exchanges can serve
as examples: the first comes from Wittgenstein’s struggle to publish the Tracta-
tus, through the most apophatic abstract in philosophy coming from the letter to
Ludwig von Ficker:
I wanted to write that my work consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of every-
thing which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important one. For the
Ethical is delimited only from within, as it were, by my book; and I’m convinced that, strict-
ly speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this way. In brief, I think: All of that which many
are babbling today, I have defined in my book by remaining silent about it.” (CLF 1969: 35)
The second appearing in the correspondence with P. Engelmann about Uhland’s
poem “Count Eberhard’s Hawthorn”: “[…] and this is how it is: if only you do not
try to utter [auszusprechen] what is unutterable [Unaussprechliche], then noth-
ing gets lost. But the unutterable will be – unutterably – contained in what
has been uttered!” (CPE 1970: 62).
Playing around what can be said and what cannot is a feature that links
Wittgenstein’s philosophy and poetry. While on the other side a desire for creat-
ing physically, producing a physical object was also tormenting the philoso-
pher’s soul as it is shown by his first fascination with machines, his interest
in observing women sewing rather than philosophizing, his care for objects,
from architecture of buildings to the smallest elements of daily life. Equally an
envy of Leibniz, or Spinoza (see MDC 1981: 120) could be discerned because
their philosophy was worked out in ateliers requiring sophisticated handcraft.
2 Confession
Wittgenstein’s laboratory or atelier where some kind of craft has been exercised
appeared clearly in Norway during his stay at Skjølden in 1936. Simple life, or
rather these conditions of life that required continuous physical effort, starting
from rowing to the closest village, up to making fire in an isolated hut under
very poor weather conditions, these were elements through which Wittgenstein
was preparing a “decent” philosophy. But there was also another “laboratory”
in which the efforts were not lest significant. It is not surprising that The
Brown Book that he was intending to revise during his Norwegian stay begins
with Saint Augustine’s description of learning language (kept as § 1 of Philosoph-
ical Investigations), as Ray Monk has already observed, it is the religious autobio-
graphical part of Saint Augustine that provided him this introductory position
since “for Wittgenstein, all philosophy, in so far as it is pursued honestly and de-
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cently, begins with a confession. […] What gets in the way of genuine under-
standing is often not one’s lack of intelligence, but the presence of one’s
pride” (Monk 1991: 855). Skjølden in 1936 was for Wittgenstein a laboratory
meant to prepare a whole life confession.
Here again many remarks and personal memories have turned “Wittgen-
stein’s confession” into a figure inspiring both philosophers and artists. The
chosen confidents of this act of avowal have left evocative descriptions of
what happened when Wittgenstein forced them to assume this role. “[I]t put
me into a temper to be told firmly, when I asked whether it was urgent (I believe
one of the children was not well), that it was urgent and could not wait” (Pascal
1981: 48). The descriptions offer more than enough for a mise en scène. Fania
Pascal continues her didascalia: “a mental attitude appear in the memory bear-
ing physical attributes – I could swear to it now that he kept his mackintosh on
throughout, buttoned up, sitting up very straight and forbiddingly” (Pascal 1981:
48). The event in its peculiarity seemed to force the confidents to give an account
(Pascal 1981: 50); that impulse could be an extension of Wittgenstein’s own un-
typical (not to say irrational) urge expressed among others in these words ad-
dressed to Ludwig Hänsel – “for now I must write [the confession] to the others,
for know it they must” (CLH 2003: 285, Wittgenstein’s emphasis). This drive for
confessing was transmitted to the listeners who, at first, generally were reluc-
tant: “If ever a thing could wait”, I thought facing him across the table, “it is
a confession of this kind and made in this manner” (Pascal 1981: 48). Such an-
tagonistic reaction of Fania Pascal was not unique, Ludwig Hänsel answered in a
letter from the 15th of November 1936: “But to make the content of the letter
known now, to read it to others, to send it around, this you must not demand
from me. Don’t be angry at my refusal!” (CLH 2003: 286). Maurice O’Drury
who kept the content of the confession secret relates to Moore’s –another addres-
see of the confession – unwilling reaction:
When [Wittgenstein] returned from Norway he told me that he had done no writing there
but had spent his time in prayer. He had felt it necessary to write out a confession of
those things in his past life of which he was most ashamed. He insisted on me reading
this. He had already shewn it to Moore, and he said that Moore had seemed very distressed
that he had had to read it (MDC 1981: 135).
The last two “Englishmen”, expectedly, could not authorize themselves to “come
out with a matter told [them] in confidence” (Pascal 1981: 48). Many others sim-
ply refused to read the letter (… ) especially if it hasn’t been addressed to them
personally (as it was the case with Paul Wittgenstein). Nevertheless, the range of
addressees was as vast as the expression used in the letter to Hänsel – Wittgen-
stein’s “family and friends”. It is only speculation but it seems that the narratives
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we have about this confession would not be so numerous and alike if the content
were not so minor from the ethical point of view. This inadequacy between the
non-significance of the iniquities with the frame-scene of confession was well
described by Fania Pascal: “At one stage I cried out: “What is it? You want to
be perfect?” And he pulled himself up proudly, saying: “Of course I want to
be perfect”. This memory alone would make me burst with the wish to describe
the scene” (Pascal 1981: 50).
The majority of answers to Wittgenstein consisted in a reference to one’s sin-
fulness, trying uselessly to console Wittgenstein by a general (far too general for
Wittgenstein) “confiteor” (“to each of the sins you confessed I could juxtapose
my own, or far worse ones of the same kind” (CF 1996: no. 123, 154). But Wittgen-
stein “did not ask for an emotional response. His manner forbade it” (Pascal
1981: 49), he expected nor consolation, nor empathy. He was entering on this
scene alone, overcoming fear and facing his main enemy – pride.
Although we are able to understand why philosophy required this prelimina-
ry spiritual exercise of confession, we are nevertheless confused with the pres-
ence of a third party in this intimate relation of the soul with itself or at most
with God. Together with members of Wittgenstein’s family and his friends we
feel exposed to this final act of a spiritual struggle (and I intentionally refrain
from using the term “religious” since Wittgenstein was very consciously choosing
the term “Geständnis” rather than “Beichte” referring to his act). In order to de-
velop the philosophical sense of this exposition of one’s own sinfulness we need
to leave aside the natural tendency to separate biographical claims from philo-
sophical one’s, envisaging the famous link of “logic and sin” from the exception-
al angle of the expressed confession. The confession content won’t be the object
of our reflection, no more than the sense of guilt, but the sole presence of sins
pronounced and heard –which means the coming out of an urge to inform the
others about one’s own wretchedness prepared through prayers and loneliness.
Some of the confessional letters are explicitly meant to be an introduction to far-
ther face-to-face confessions after Wittgenstein’s return from Norway. This was
the case with the plea addressed to Ludwig Hänsel asked to make known the
written confession “to his wife & children, to Wittgenstein’s siblings & their chil-
dren, to Drobil & other Wittgenstein’s friends & Mrs. Sjögren […] that is, that you
let them read it”, wrote Wittgenstein. Hänsel protested “I don’t have the strength
for it!” (CLH 2003: 285) Finally, convinced he decided to send the confession to
Wittgenstein’s sisters. According to Arvid Sjögren a letter of confession addressed
directly to the family has been exhibited in the family Wittgenstein’s house for
whoever wanted to read it (CF 1996: no. 215, 154). The reading room of the family
Wittgenstein residence became the scene of a theatre.
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3 Theatre
Let’s imagine a theatre, the curtain goes up & and we see someone alone in his room walk-
ing up and down, lighting a cigarette, seating himself etc. so that suddenly we are observ-
ing a human being from outside in a way that ordinarily we can never observe ourselves; as
if we were watching a chapter from a biography with our own eyes, – surely this would be
at once uncanny and wonderful. More wonderful than anything that a playwright could
cause to be acted or spoken on the stage. We should be seeing life itself. – But then we
do see this every day & it makes not the slightest impression on us! True enough, but
we do not see it from that point of view. (VB 1980: 6e)
This remark followed an exchange with Paul Engelmann who noticed that when
he found his own manuscripts in a drawer he estimated them as being “glorious
[and] worth presenting to other people” until imagining them published, thence-
forth, they were losing all this “charm and value”.Wittgenstein who enjoyed the
example very much developed the description:
[Engelmann] is seeing his life as God’s work of art, & as such it is certainly worth contem-
plating […] But only the artist can represent the individual thing so that it appears to us a
work of art; those manuscripts rightly lose their value if we contemplate them singly & in
any case without prejudice, i.e. without being enthusiastic about them in advance. (VB
1980: 6e-7e)
When the curtain goes up and the scene is enlightened by the stream of a “right
perspective”, becoming “a work of art” or “God’s work of art” within the light of
“enthusiasm”, something bare becomes something special. Though the enthusi-
asm is termed a “prejudice”, and as a prejudice it is “rightly” (Wittgenstein’s em-
phasis) subject to devaluation. But while observing language in use, looking at
the stage instead of thinking (“don’t think, but look!” [PI 1958: § 66]) Wittgen-
stein tried to sustain as far as possible this flash in which a remarkable equation
appears between the right perspective, the prejudice, enthusiasm and art. This
equivalence referring to the first part of our essay should now be juxtaposed
to confession. Wittgenstein’s envy for art consisted in its ability for such an ex-
position of one’s experiences of life that preserves the experience of exaltation
by the artist and conveys it to the audience.
(I am always reminded [– continues Wittgenstein –] of one of those insipid photographs of
a piece of scenery which is interesting to the person who took it because he was there him-
self, experienced something, but which a third party looks at with justifiable coldness; in-
sofar as it is ever justifiable to look at something with coldness) (VB 1980: 7e)
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This ending remark from the commentary to Engelmann’s experience is crucial
and supplements our equation with the opposition of cold and warm points of
view. On the one hand, the cold, general and rightly devaluating perspective is
reasonable, but its justice or – let’s say – righteousness is explicitly questioned.
In an experience of everyday life, when admiring one’s own piece of work or
piece of nature we can receive it as a wonder, a miracle or a value, but when
sharing our experience we meet the problem of expression. According to the
Tractatus, we are unable to express nor aesthetic, nor ethic, nor religious values,
still, Wittgenstein is not willing to choose the via negativa– “the inexpressible
would be [nevertheless] inexpressibly present in an act of expression”. The pres-
ence inside the act of expression when sharing our feeling of miraculousness is
something that Wittgenstein pursuits and we should be careful in comprehend-
ing its nature.
The theatrical framework of the studied perspective/prejudice/warm point of
view entails the reminiscence of one of Wittgenstein’s theatrical episode of at-
tending a performance by Ludwig Anzengruber’s Die Kreuzelscheiber in Vienna
and the assertion that has been pronounced by one of the characters: “Nothing
bad can happen to me”. According to Norman Malcolm’s narrative this expres-
sion made Wittgenstein think “for the first time” about the possibility of religion.
Even though this supposition might be exaggerated (as Wittgenstein was surely
reflecting about religion well before this event), truth is that this episode appears
in the Lecture on Ethics as an example of a nonsensical – yet must-be-expressed
– statement. It is pronounced under the necessity of living an experience of ab-
solute safety, a sensation which was according to Wittgenstein consonant with
the feeling of being “safe in the hands of God” (LE 1965: 10; Monk 1991). Al-
though the theatre drama was “mediocre” (Monk 1991) some inexpressible feel-
ing has been wrapped in a line, pronounced and heard by one particular partic-
ipant of the audience. And Wittgenstein never forgot the expression of this
feeling: an expression that could be lucidly perceived as an absurd, but ex-
pressed within this theatrical framework had so much strength that it could ren-
der religion possible. If one had pronounced this nonsense in such a way, only
religion (i.e. God the Savior) could condition its meaningfulness.
If ever Wittgenstein’s confession could be treated within such a theatrical
perspective a necessary redefinition of entering into a role-performance should
be undertaken.
What I perform so to speak […] on stage in my soul doesn’t render its condition more beau-
tiful but (rather) more despicable. And yet again and again I take myself to be beautifying
this condition through a beautiful scene on the stage. For I am sitting in the auditorium
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rather than viewing everything from the outside. For I don’t like standing on the sober, or-
dinary, unfriendly street but like sitting in the warm, pleasant, auditorium.
Yes, only for a few moments I step out into the open & perhaps even then only with the
feeling of being able to slip back into the warmth at any time. (DB 2003: 111)
In this fragment we come again upon the warm perspective of the theatre-audi-
ence among which Wittgenstein is also eager to sit, albeit the performance and
Wittgenstein himself in the role of the metteur en scène contribute to a more
shameful appearance of his own drama. The reasons of the philosopher’s deci-
sion to put a mask on his face should not be interpreted straightforwardly as dis-
tancing, on the contrary,Wittgenstein like Descartes advances masked (“larvatus
prodeo”) onto the stage in his very own name. Descartes justified wearing a mask
(“like actors who do not want to show the redness of their faces”) by intending to
see the reaction of the public to his un/dis-covered “ego cogito”². Why did Witt-
genstein follow this gesture by wearing the mask of the worst iniquities?³ Like
Descartes he felt the necessity to explain the presence of art as domain of pre-
tense:
When I am thinking of my confession, I understand the expression. “…. & had not love etc.”
For, even this confession would be of no use to me if it were made as it were like an artful
ethical trick. But I don’t want to say that I refrained from it because the mere trick was not
enough for me: I am too cowardly for it.
(An artful ethical trick is something that I perform for others, or also for me (myself),
in order to show what I can do) (DB 2003: 133, my emphasis U.I.-S.)
“Had not love” is obviously a reference to the Letters to the Corinthians, 13:1–3:
“If I speak with the eloquence of men and of angels, but have no love, I become
no more than blaring brass or crashing cymbal”. Talking about speech as art of
eloquence Saint Paul adopts a derogatory attitude. The artfulness of the ethical
trick, speaking in Wittgensteinian terms, has also to do with eloquence.Wittgen-
stein seemed to be disputing his own mastery of words when preparing his con-
 “Ut comoedi, moniti ne in fronte appareat pudor, personam induunt : sic ego, hoc mundi
theatrum conscensurus, in quo hactenus spectator exsiti, larvatus prodeo” (“Like comedians
wear masks to cover the shyness on the faces, me too, when coming up on the stage of the
world theatre where up to now I have only been a spectator, I am advancing masked”). (Des-
cartes 1908: 213)
 See LUS 2004, where in a fragment found by Ilse Somavilla in Rudolf Köder’s legacy Wittgen-
stein describes a dream inside which his was making him compliments about his intellectual
superiority and following his strong counter-reaction of penitence – praying and admitting
his wretchedness (“total nullity”) in the eyes of God.
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fessions, both written and oral. Between his own conscience to be examined and
the fact of formulating statements of facts, vanity was sneaking in.
Everything or nearly everything I do, these entries included, is tinted by vanity & the best I
can do is as it were to separate, to isolate the vanity & do what’s right in spite of it, even
though it is always watching. I cannot chase her away/ only sometimes it is not present (DB
2003: 23).
Observing his wretchedness Wittgenstein could easily fall into the pride coming
from the heroism of his confession, or the brightness of his intimate soul exami-
nation. The passage was very narrow. The spiritual exercise that Wittgenstein
was devoting himself to in order to “isolate vanity” required the presence of oth-
ers, although this same presence was generating further dangers. Vanity is also
relational – we are proud of our truthfulness, but on the other hand, our wretch-
ed nature can make us forfeit someone else’s love. This was what Wittgenstein
truly feared the most.
What we notice here is an ethical mirror of logic, in which vanity acts in the
role of any value that appears in an illegitimate way inside assertions about
facts. When Wittgenstein isolates vanity from his most intimate remarks, he
tries to clear language, the same way he did at the beginning of his philosophical
career.
4 Winn-genstein
The metaphor of the theatre stage as the place where the taking apart from van-
ity is performed requires that we inverse the ordinary way of attributing traits of
sincerity and pretense in art. Sincerity doesn’t necessarily proceed through an
unmasking; on the contrary, it is by wearing the mask of the worst iniquities
that Wittgenstein comes out. As it has been the case with Descartes the mask
can be an instrument of sincerity – of the philosopher’s readiness to speak in
his own name (see Badiou 2011⁴). From behind a mask of guilt Wittgenstein ap-
 “The antiphilosopher thus necessarily speaks in his proper name, and he must show this
‘proper’ as real proof of his saying. In effect, there is no validation and no compensation for
his act except immanent to this act itself, since he denies that this act can ever be justified in
the order of theory. It is moreover in such a way that Wittgenstein conceives of any true act:
‘There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must re-
side in the action itself’ (6.422) The biographical impulse, the taste for confession, and even in
the end a highly recognizable infatuation that commands the ‘writerly’ style of all antiphiloso-
phers (if you go back to the list, there is not a single one who is not a master of language): these
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pears on stage in order to see the reaction of his loved ones. Acceptance, forgive-
ness, empathy are all together inaccurate reactions to this performance.What is
expected is only love. Love conditions the truthfulness without vanity of the per-
formed confession; similarly as the performance of Die Kreuzelscheiber (through
Wittgenstein’s reception) was conditioning a religious feeling of safety and thus
religion itself. Consequently, love becomes the condition of being or not being –
according to this remark inside which it is covertly present:
…to be deprived of the affection of others would be altogether impossible for me because in
this sense I have far too little (or no) self. Perhaps I have a self only insofar as I feel actually
reprobate.
And when I say that I feel reprobate, this is no expression (or just hardly ever an ex-
pression) of this feeling (DB 2003: 113)
Therefore Wittgenstein’s self disappears both without the affection of others and
without a sense of guilt. The two seem to create a dramaturgical tension around
the self. And this relationship is caught only in actuality, which means that the
self hasn’t got the ability to endure, but vanishes together with the vanishing of
the feeling.
But how to understand that “to feel actually reprobate” is not an expression
of feeling? It seems that it is here that we need the framework of the theatre
stage.
WINNIE: Hail, holy light. [Long pause. She closes her eyes. Bell rings loudly. She opens
eyes at once. Bell stops. She gazes front. Long smile. Smile off. Long pause.] Someone is
looking at me still. [Pause]. Eyes on my eyes. [Pause]. What is that unforgettable line?
[Pause. Eyes right.] Willie. [Pause. Louder.] Willie. [Pause. Eyes front.] May one still
speak of time? [Pause.] Say it is a long time now, Willie, since I saw you. [Pause.] Since I
heard you. [Pause.] May one? [Pause.] I used to think…[Pause]…I say I used to think that
I would learn to talk alone. [Pause] By that I mean to myself, the wilderness. [Smile.]
But no. [Smile broader.] No no. [Smile off.] Ergo you are there. [Pause.] Oh no doubt you
are dead like the others, no doubt you have died, or gone away and left me, like the others,
it doesn’t matter you are there, the same as ever, I can see it. (Beckett 2012b: n.p.)
This beginning of the second act of Samuel Beckett’s Happy Days offers us the
adequate dramaturgy for understanding the non-expressionist character of Witt-
genstein’s confession. Winnie, the female character, embedded up to the neck
begins her day having at her disposal only words to be pronounced, song to
are the necessary consequences of the most intimate antiphilosophical certainty, the one that
consists, against millennia of philosophy, in the duty to announce and practice an active salvific
break in one’s own name only.” (Badiou 2011: 88).
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be sung (–“not too early”), prayers to be prayed. Her companion Willie is no lon-
ger within her purview, perhaps gone away, perhaps dead “like the others”. Nev-
ertheless Winnie’s logical inference implies that Willie is listening to her. Be-
cause she is not disposed to speak to the wall, which means that her words
cannot be vain and require if not a response, at least a listener.
Mutilate a human being all the way, cut off his arms & legs nose & ears & then see what
remains of his self-respect & of his dignity & to what extent his concepts of such things
still remain the same.We have no idea how these concepts depend on the ordinary, normal,
condition of our body. What becomes of them when we are led by a leash with a ring
through our tongues & tied up? How much of a human being then remains in him? Into
what sort of state does such a human being sink? We don’t know that we are on a high
and narrow rock & around us chasms in which everything looks completely different.
(DB 2003: 147– 149)
Beckett appeals to perform on stage exactly this kind of “mutilation” that Witt-
genstein describes.Winnie is sinking into the sands that are slowly enclosing her
body. From the beginning she seems to have nothing left, only a bag with several
objects and a few stories that ritualize her day. This paucity requires a rigorous
economy of time – both from Winnie, from the actress playing her role and from
the audience. “Nothing happens”, as usual in Beckett’s plays, but Winnie is
nonetheless surprising us: there is no dense atmosphere of existential emptiness
in the horizon of the coming end. Winnie seems to save herself from the fate of
many other Beckett’s characters. Her economy works perfectly, her language
game reassures, perhaps she even “win(s)”, according to her fiancée Willie’s
last word being probably the effect of an interrupted calling of her name.
This analogy between Winnie and the confessing Wittgenstein would not ap-
pear to us without the performance of this role of a great actress of Polish theatre
and film Maja Komorowska. Her Winnie, her mise-en-scène⁵ attests to the specif-
icity of words pronounced from the stage, contrary to those read by an interpret-
er. Speaking about the actress’s performance without mentioning the theatre di-
rector seems legitimate in this case, because Beckett gives a dense script similar
to a music score⁶, intended to describe every gesture of hands and face appear-
ances without leaving space between his text and the actor; it is the actor, who is
the true “metteur en scène”. It is the actress who places (fr. mettre) the character
 The play “Szczęśliwe dni (The Happy Days)” directed by Antoni Libera in the Warsaw theatre
Teatr Dramatyczny (première in 1995), cast: Maja Komorowska (Winnie), Adam Ferency (Willie).
 I refer here to Tadeusz Kantor’s use of the term “partytura” (german Partitur) meaning music
score instead of script for his theatre plays. Linking the role of the director with the music con-
ductor Kantor was present at every performance of his plays.
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on the stage, lending to Winnie her own body. And Maja Komorowska performs
this sacrifice without remainder. “Winnie doesn’t give time to catch my breath”,
avows Komorowska in a book interview with Tadeusz Sobolewski (Komorowska
& Sobolewski 2014: 24).
The bag is there Willie as good as ever, the one you gave me that day … to go to market.
[Pause. Eyes front] That day. [Pause] What day? [Pause.] I used to pray. [Pause] Yes, I
must confess I did. [Smile.] Not now. [Smile broader] No no. [Smile off. Pause] Then…
now… what difficulties here, for the mind. [Pause] To have been always what I am – and
so changed from what I was. [Pause] I am the one, I say the one, then the other. [Pause]
There is so little one can say, one says it all [Pause.] All one can. [Pause] […] Ah well,
not to know, not to know for sure, great mercy, all I ask. [Pause]. (Beckett 2012b)
The actress produces the subsequent lines of the score instant after instant,
nothing stored up, as she says, with a special “tact” towards the pronounced
words even when, after pronouncing them, she discovers “they are all empty”.
But sometimes “[w]ords fail, there are times when even they fail” – when listen-
ing to this clause we are succumbed to ask the question that appeared to Winnie
a couple of lines before, when she was speaking about her hair: “I shall simply
brush and comb them later on, purely and simply, I have the whole. – [Pause.
Puzzled.] Them? [Pause]. Or it? [Pause.] “Brush and comb it? […] What would
you say, Willie, speaking of your hair, them or it?” (Beckett 2012b)
Thanks to Winnie words receive individuality, engaging a quasi-personalism
of language close to Wittgenstein’s remark “words are deeds” (VB 1980: 53e). In-
side this wilderness where Winnie has been entombment (like Antigone at the
beginning of the art of drama), words seem to free and alienate themselves
from her voice resounding in the echoing space of the theatre.Winnie pronoun-
ces them but also, and perhaps furthermost, she is listening to “them” when they
are coming back to her. She would perhaps prefer to hear someone else, that is
why she creates a small puppet theatre with Mildred and a doll with “china blue
eyes that open and shut”, or an imagined pair of last humans who got lost
around – figures which reminds of others Beckett’s characters, with their bags
in hands, vanishing on the horizon. Winnie amuses us with those repeated sto-
ries like she amuses herself to fill the emptiness of the day. A Chinese box struc-
ture appears inside the narrative. Perhaps in that case we should inquire Winnie
with the same questions that she poses to her characters. But “whoever asks a
person in a play what he’s experiencing when he’s speaking?” (LW 1982: 7e), in-
terrogates rhetorically Wittgenstein. A stage entity should not be asked about her
private mental state. Meaning appears through words that are framed by a spe-
cific theatrical atmosphere. While sitting in the auditorium we are inside the
“beetle box”, even in a Chinese box structure of the drama we should not
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seek for a different one.We are clutched inside like children who agree for a play
of imagination and get involved in the story with all their heart (“This is only his
box. The sheep you asked for is inside. I was very surprised to see a light break
over the face of my young judge: ‘That is exactly the way I wanted it! Do you
think that this sheep will have to have a great deal of grass?’”[Saint-Exupéry
2004: 8]).
When I am gripped by a tragedy (in the cinema, for example). I always tell myself: no, I
won’t do it like that! Or: no, it shouldn’t be like that I want to console the hero & everyone
[…] that’s why I only understand the happy end (in the primitive sense). The downfall of the
hero I don’t understand – I mean, with the heart. So what I really always want is to hear a
fairy tale. (DB 2003: 97)
“Understanding with the heart” means that we want a happy ending – the will
precedes the facts. You don’t accept the downfall of the hero even if you are able
to understand its reasons. It’s just a play, just a stage entity. Don’t think, don’t
explain⁷, don’t build new myths, don’t be a philosopher, don’t interpret – just
look. But within this “just” the actress is being consumed. Winnie in her seem-
ingly “light” role consumes the actress more than any heavily dramatic role of
Ibsenian type⁸. The protophenomenon observed on scene should be denuded
from metaphysics, from unconscious, from any sort of overbuilt interpretation.
In its nudity it will be sufficiently striking or, more precisely, only this bareness
will be striking enough to produce an understanding with the heart.
Nevertheless “defactoism” (Fogelin 2009) or “critical description” (Cavell
1976) can be misleading if we underestimate the value of this “just”⁹. Therefore
we need to delineate carefully the difference between this “just” and a politics of
bare facts, a difference from a vulgar showing off on stage, from simple phenom-
enology. According to what we have established in the first part of this essay we
notice the advantage of the artist over the philosopher in observing this differ-
 see Philosophical Investigations § 654: “Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we
ought to look at what happens as a ‘proto-phenomenon.’ That is, where we ought to have
said: this language-game is played [Dieses Sprachspiel wird gespielt].” (PI 1958: § 654)
 According to Furlani when the actress Jessica Tandy wanted to clarify her role for Not I Beckett
wrote to the director; “I no more know where she is or why thus than she does. All I know is in
the text. ‘She’ is purely a stage entity, part of a stage image and purveyor of a stage text. The rest
is Ibsen.” (Furlani 2012: 51)
 Furlani relates also: “The actor Horst Bollmann recollected of the 1965 West Berlin production
of Warten auf Godot, which Beckett assisted: ‘When Beckett came the sun was rising for us, ev-
erything became so clear and we were altogether very content, you know. Ohne Metaphysik—
genau richtig [‘Without metaphysics—just right’]. The first night was a huge success’.” (Furlani
2012: 52, following Knowlson & Knowlson 2006: 180)
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ence. The work of art, the craft of the actor placed on stage change bareness into
something special.We are seduced.We are engaged in Winnie’s most prosaic ac-
tivities like making her nails or brushing hair, clenching to them as if these ac-
tivities were of life and death importance, as if they could help to live the theatre
play (life) up to the end (death).
Knowlson and Knowlson recollect memories from Beckett’s actor who were
“searching and digging to get at the deeper sense” of their role until Beckett ar-
rived to the rehearsal, saying: “But why? It’s so simple. It’s just a play”. These
apparently reductive and empty remarks helped the actors very much (Knowlson
& Knowlson 2006: 180). But they were becoming insightful only if pronounced
by Beckett, as well as only in Wittgenstein’s mouth the words “don’t think,
look” had the imperative of a commandment. The same seduction can take
place in reality – this is what learning to see means. And Wittgenstein changes
into a metteur en scène when his remarks on reality grasp our imagination. A
“woman standing on the jetty dressed in a trouser suit […] [looking] magnifi-
cent”, seen by Wittgenstein from a boat on the way back from Norway, is such
an image perceived to the same extent by us, the spectators/readers of Wittgen-
stein, that Mr. Shower and Mrs. Shower “hand in hand”. “What does it mean?”,
says Mr. Shower gaping at Winnie – “What’s it meant to mean” to what Mrs.
Shower replies with sober malice: “And you […] what are you meant to mean?”(-
Beckett 2012b) There is no meaning meant by the picture. For Wittgenstein a pic-
ture was very often meant rather to silence inopportune questions than to ask
some¹⁰. Only the meaning of words, the form of names, grammatical rules
stop Winnie’s narrative (“What is a hog exactly?”; “Shower – Shower – does
the name mean anything – to you,Willie – evoke any reality, I mean […] or Cook-
er, perhaps I should say Cooker”). This is the only legitimate form of interroga-
tion – a sign of the fact that questions do come to an end. There must be an end.
And this end – in a vast sense of reality, interpretation and justification – was
fascinating both for Wittgenstein and Beckett. This sort of endgame – conscious-
ly making use of Beckett’s title – consists in the ability of reaching the founda-
tions of expression. “Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to
 In Wittgenstein’s sister Hermine memoir about her brother an example of “communication
in comparisons” where an image is meant to end a discussion is evoked. To Hermine’s metaphor
of using precision tools to open crates for describing Wittgenstein’s decision to become a school
teacher,Wittgenstein replied with a comparison,which as she admitted made her understand his
state of mind and “silenced” her definitively. She was compared by Ludwig to someone who “is
looking through a closed window and cannot explain to himself the strange movements of a
passer-by. He doesn’t know what kind of a storm is raging outside and that this person is per-
haps only with great effort keeping himself on his feet”. (Hermine Wittgenstein 1981: 5).
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an end; – but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as
true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at
the bottom of the language game” (OC 1974: § 204). In this late remark from
On Certainty the evidence of the image is overshadowed by “acting”, that we
might, for the sake of our argument, understand as theatre performance. The in-
tended “actuality” happens inside the theatre¹¹. The fundamental language
game is built on a theatre performance – the only stage interpretation that we
are capable of imagining.Words come from the stage and are received by the au-
dience or, more exactly, by one particular participant of this audience, the one
who understands now because he already has understood. He knows because
he has already felt exactly the same experience that forces to express in such
and such way. He has already climbed on this ladder (TLP 4.022, 4.3¹²). And if
he has, then the ladder is no longer useful. “Do not come down the ladder,
Ifor, I haf taken it away”(Beckett 2012a: n. p.). Explanation is no longer needed,
or even more: any form of explanation destroys the effect.
The narrow rock where a mutilated human being has been led by a leash
and is now observed as the place of final and fundamental decisions. Its two
slopes correspond to life and death – as if this rock was one of those perfect sui-
cidal locations. This is how we should listen to Winnie, not without reason hav-
ing at her disposal a revolver. (“Remember Brownie [referring to the revolver
U.I.S.], Willie? [Pause]. Remember how you used to keep on at me to take it
away from you? Take it away, Winnie, take it away, before I put myself out of
my misery!” [Beckett 2012a: n. p.]) The horizon of both Beckett and Wittgen-
stein’s reading should be seen as a horizon of suicidal deferral (the way we
speak of “nuclear deferral”).
But let’s observe first the lighter slope corresponding to the choice of life. As
we have already noticed Winnie resists falling into despair: the revolver is there
(“conspicuous”), “contemplated” but than laid down into the bag. Winnie is
rather thankful – she renders “great mercy” for the smallest things that happen
in her life. And those smallest things receive from her the greatest unmeasured
 I found in Furlani a confirmation of my hypothesis: “Beckett could draw clarifying philo-
sophical confirmation of his aesthetic practice from Wittgenstein’s thought.Wittgenstein’s think-
ing recommends itself here because for Wittgenstein the theatre afforded exemplary demonstra-
tions of the nature of selfhood and alterity, rule following, and interpretation” (Furlani 2012:
Please add the page number!!!!1)
 “My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way” – writes Wittgenstein – “any-
one who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them –
as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has
climbed up it).” (TLP 1961: 6.54)
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welcome – she cannot live without admiring. “I feel well only when I am in a
certain sense enthusiastic”, echoes Wittgenstein, adding at once:
Then again I fear the collapse of this enthusiasm […]
I am often pained by the thought of how much the success or value of what I do de-
pends on how I am disposed. More so than for a concert singer. Nothing is as it were stored
up in me; nearly everything must be produced at the moment. That – I believe – is a very
unusual sort of activity or life. (DB 2003: 19; 23)
In this context Wittgenstein might very well use the analogy to an actor, especial-
ly in Winnie’s intensive role. “The best state for me is the state of enthusiasm
because it consumes the ridiculous thoughts at least partially & renders them
harmless.” (DB 2003: 19)
Those ridiculous thoughts that potentially could be harmful suggest a suici-
dal nature. Only an amplified enthusiasm renders them harmless. Winnie, the
character and the actress, achieves on stage a similar enthusiasm, she asks for-
giveness for any sort of sadness that appears to her mind and immediately sends
it off. “[C]an’t complain – mustn’t complain – so much to be thankful for – no
pain – hardly any… no no” – such and similar expressions are repeated like
an exhortation (Beckett 2012b). It is always “another happy day” for Winnie.
Just before dying Wittgenstein has pronounced consonant words: “tell them I
have had a wonderful life” (MAM 1958: 100). It wasn’t meant to be a private sen-
tence; “tell them” was no less important than the content of the message. The
exclamation of admiration has been for Wittgenstein the only right form of an
ethical proposition, its only possible justification. To the proposition “you
shall do this” the only possible referent is a proposition that makes an impres-
sion on the one who is addressed. It may be admiration or disgust – but these are
the only justification “worthy of its name”
An ethical proposition states “you shall do this” or “that is good” but not “these people say
that this is good”. But an ethical proposition is a personal act. Not a statement of fact. Like
an exclamation of admiration. Just consider that the justification of an “ethical proposition”
merely attempts to refer the proposition back to others that make an impression on you. If
in the end you don’t have disgust for this & admiration for that, then there is no justification
worthy of that name.) (DB 2003: 85)
This justification through admiring replaces looking for reasons or explanations.
Admiration silences any sort of “but”, any sort of harmful thought. If you are
amazed – you understand. You have already understood, you do not longer
need the ladder to go down. And, furthermore, you can live on. On the contrary,
if you are still waiting for another rung of the ladder (i.e. another argument) you
can slip and fall down the other slope of the rock – the one that corresponds to a
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lack of admiration (admiration, which appears not to be gradated) and implies a
cold point of view. “Insofar as it is ever justifiable to look at something with cold-
ness” – speculates Wittgenstein. Is it justifiable? Coldness is opposed to the
warm interior of the audience from the metaphor mentioned earlier. When the
performance corresponds to confession its reception within a cold point of
view – the opposite of love – can have devastating consequences. On the top
of the rocky summit where Wittgenstein has taken us the confessing subject
chooses life or death. No matter how few and minor are the sins, at these heights
even a perjury about one’s origin (Wittgenstein confessed several times about his
Jewish origins) may lead to suicide. One’s ethical judgment about oneself is a
question of impression, not expression. Which means that the feeling of being
judged good or bad cannot be expressed, but is the result of impression – “I
have a self only insofar as I feel reprobate”. The confessing subject in his abso-
lute loneliness receives this impression from words he is pronouncing. Words
look through the one who pronounces them; they are freed from the logic of jus-
tification, the one of pride and vanity, “beg your pardon, nodrap geb nodrap
geb”¹³ (Beckett 2012a: n. p.)
 This passage is an extract of eight stages of Watt’s experiment with language that goes as
follows: “So we began, after so long a time, to walk together again, and to talk, from time to
time. As Watt walked, as now he talked, back to front. The following is an example of Watt’s
manner, at this period:
Day of most, night of part, Knott with now. Now till up, little seen so oh, little heard so oh.
Night till morning from. Heard I this, saw I this then what. Thing quiet, dim. Ears, eyes, failing
now also. Hush in, mist in, moved I so.
[…] The utterance was as rapid, and as muffled as before. These were sounds that at first,
though we walked face to face, were devoid of significance for me. Nor did Watt follow me.
Pardon beg, he said, pardon, pardon beg. […]
But soon I grew used to these sounds, and then I understood as well as before. So all went
well until Watt began to invert, no longer the order of the sentences in the period, but that of
words in the sentence together with that of the letters in the word. The following is an example
of Watt’s manner at this period:
Deed did taw? Tonk. Tog da taw? Tonk. Luf puk saw? Hap! Deen did tub? Ton sparp. To da
tub? Ton wonk
These were sounds that at first though we walked belly to belly were so much wind to me.
Nor did Watt follow me.
Nodrap, geb, he said, nodrap, nodrap geb” (Beckett 2012a: n. p.) This passage ending with
“beg your pardon” pronounced back to front is an extract of eight stages of Watt’s experiment
with language. It is a perfect example of what Jakub Momro has fittingly called “logical seman-
tics of madness” (Momro 2010). It has been associated by Marjorie Perloff to the period of Beck-
ett engagement to the résistance in Paris 1940,where he has been assigned to the cell of a réseau
de renseignement transmitting information about Axis troop movements and sending them to
London. Beckett’s pseudonym was “Sam” (like the name of the protagonist cited below) (Perloff
Wittgenstein and the Theatre of Confession 17
Someone who in this way opens his heart to God in remorseful confession opens it for oth-
ers too. He thereby loses his dignity as someone special and so becomes like a child. That
means without office, dignity & aloofness from others. You can open yourself to others only
out of a particular kind of love.Which acknowledges as it were that we are all wicked chil-
dren. (VB 1980: 52e)
Winnie seems such a child, lacking selfhood, but perhaps only in the eyes of
someone who sitting in the warm auditorium receives her not from distance,
but with empathy or love.Wittgenstein was always trying “to be loved & not ad-
mired” (VB 1980: 44e), since admiration was for him the source of vanity – his
major temptation. In the warm audience of the theatre, in the reading room of
the Wittgenstein’s residence, in front of a lunatic who imposes on us his confes-
sion, who cannot stop speaking making us embarrassed, we experience confes-
sion in its pure state. Bernhard said that words are judging us. But within the
anti-essentialist approach those words can no longer be arguments, words of
honor, symbols, but only indistinct sounds released from the mastery of the
speaking subject. Wittgenstein never referred to them with coldness because
coldness impedes further living (“There is far too little self…”). The confessing
subject has no self, or has a self only feeling reprobate and loved all the same
– not forgiven, not justified but caught within a warm point of view. Between
the stage and the theatre auditorium, a mutual observation is taking place. It
is only through words performed on scene, in a condition of being masked
but at the same exposed that words look at us, words in which eyes I have be-
come a problem for myself (paraphrasing Saint Augustine).
God may say to me: ‘I am judging you out of your own mouth. Your have shuddered with
disgust at your own actions when you have seen them in other people’ (VB 1980: 99e).
The theatre turns into a laboratory where within a condition of mutilation of the
human body “concepts of such thing as dignity” can be redefined. Inside a body
buried up to the head, exposed to the burning sun – a fact that does not mean
anything, that is not meant to mean – the dignity is preserved only inside the
pronounced words: “tell them I have had a wonderful life”. Words at last
saved from vanity, from a misunderstood human dignity, become themselves
the agent of salvation.
1996: 123). The informative system consisted in a cut-out system in which encoding was of cru-
cial importance. In such circumstances the succession/sequence of words in a sentence was of
crucial importance “someone’s survival may literally hang on the thread of what X tells Y,who in
turn tells Z” writes Perloff (Perloff 1996:127).
18 Urszula Idziak-Smoczyńska
Bibliography
Badiou, Alain: Witggenstein Antiphilosophy, London / NewYork 2011.
Beckett, Samuel: Watt, Chris Ackerley (ed.), electronic ed., London 2012a.
Beckett, Samuel: Happy Days. A play in two acts, electronic ed., London 2012b.
Descartes, René : Cogitationes Privatae, in : Œuvres de Descartes, Charles Adam (ed.),
Paris 1908.
Cavell, Stanley: Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976.
Fogelin, Robert J.: Taking Wittgenstein at His Word, Princeton 2009.
Furlani, Andre: Beckett after Wittgenstein: The Literature of Exhausted Justification in: PMLA
(Published by Modern Literature Association) vol. 127, iss. 1, 2012.
Guetti, James: Wittgenstein and the Grammar of Literary Experience, Athens 1993.
Klagge, James C.: Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy, Cambridge 2000.
Knowlson, Elizabeth & Knowlson, James: Beckett Remembering, Remembering Beckett,
London 2006.
Komorowska, Maja & Sobolewski, Tadeusz: Pytania, które się nie kończą, Warszawa 2014.
Momro, Jakub: Literatura świadomości: Samuel Beckett, podmiot/negatywność, Kraków 2010.
Monk, Ray: Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, electronic ed., London 1990.
Pascal, Fania: A Personal Memoir, in: Rush Rhees (ed.): Recollections of Wittgenstein, Oxford
1981
Perloff, Marjorie: Wittgenstein’s Ladder, Chicago 1996.
Saint-Exupéry, Antoine: The Little Prince, download.bioon.com.cn/upload/201111/21084046_
8501.pdf (accessed: 28/08/2015).
Sebald, Winfried: Interview with Doris Stoisser, http://www.wgsebald.de/spricht/spricht.html
(accessed: 28/08/2015).
Wittgenstein, Hermine: My Brother Ludwig, in: Rush Rhees: Recollections of Wittgenstein,
Oxford: 1981.
Wittgenstein and the Theatre of Confession 19

